The paper discusses Heidegger's early notion of the "movedness of life" (Lebensbewegtheit) and its intimate connection with Aristotle's concept of movement (kinēsis). Heidegger's aim in the period of Being and Time was to "overcome" the Greek ideal of being as ousiaconstant and complete presence and availability -by showing that the background for all meaningful presence is Dasein, the ecstatically temporal context of human being. Life as the event of finitude is characterized by an essential lack and incompleteness, and the living present therefore gains meaning only in relation to a horizon of un-presence and unavailability. Whereas the "theological" culmination of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics finds the supreme fulfillment of human life in the semi-divine self-immanence and self-sufficiency of the bios theōrētikos, a radical Heideggerian interpretation of kinēsis may permit us to find in Aristotle the fundamental structures of mortal living as self-transcendent movement.
thought, become so self-evident that it is no longer even a theme for investigation. In the Heideggerian schema, it was the epochal unfolding of different implicit aspects of ousia that produced the medieval theology of the Christian God as the ens realissimum, as the most real and substantial (most constantly present) of beings; the Cartesian interpretation of the cognizing I-subject (cogito) as indubitably certain self-presence; the Hegelian interpretation of history as an unfolding of the absolute presence-to-itself of subjectivity; and, as its final phase, Nietzsche's thought of the "will to power" as the urge of the living subject to secure its self-presence through self-assertion. 9 The Heideggerian interpretation of ousia is perhaps best illustrated by Heidegger's counterexample to this principle: factical life in its motional and motivational way of being.
As analyzed by Heidegger, the human Dasein, in its most proper mode (Eigentlichkeit), simply does not present itself as a stable, unified, complete, finished, self-sufficient and perfect presence-in-itself-and-to-itself. Instead, human being has its very own way of taking place, characterized by Heidegger in Being and Time as "ek-sistence" or "ek-static temporality," 10 expressions that literally mean "standing outside"; human being is essentially "outside itself," that is, outside and beyond a purely present now of self-grasping, selfidentity and self-coincidence. The manner in which Dasein is is captured by the expression care (Sorge), which is explicated as "being-ahead-of-itself-already-in-(the-world) as beingalongside (beings encountered within-the-world)". 11 This complex structure is then elucidated in temporal terms in Part I, Division 2 of Being and Time, "Dasein and
Temporality," especially in Section 65, "Temporality as the ontological meaning of care."
Human being is essentially "ahead of itself," futural -that is, life is lived ahead, life always gains present sense or meaning from the future (Zukunft), from the possibilities and goals at which it is oriented, and sees its past, its already-having-lived (Gewesenheit), as meaningful through the possibilities it opens up for the future. Human being is essentially "already in the world," historical -that is, any meaningful present situation of life is meaningful on the basis of a de facto background, an "always already" past, a tradition which generates and delimits in advance one's own factical possibilities. Only thus can human being be "alongside beings"
-that is, encounter beings as meaningfully present in a lived situation (Gegenwart). In the Natorp account, Heidegger has a very apt expression for this "self-external" character: beingalive is essentially Aussein auf etwas, "being out for something," "being out after something." 12 In other words, human being is attracted, moved -"motivated" in the literal sense of the word -outwards, into exteriority, and this outward motivation then constitutes the transcendent character of living. However, there is no prior immanent or interior self or underlying subject to be transcended, nor is human being motivated by anything exterior to itself. Human being as such is its own outward motivation: it is a movement into its own unrealized possibilities, and these possibilities are precisely what life itself is all about, the source of its selfhood. 13 What human being as a whole aims at in its movement is precisely itself as a possibility. In Heidegger's formulation: "Dasein exists for the sake of a can-be
[Seinkönnen] of itself." 14 Precisely because of this constitutive self-motivated and self-transcendent mobility,
life cannot be grasped radically and adequately through the category of ousia. Human being is never wholly encapsulated within a self-sufficient present moment or a now, but is always outside and beyond the present, which, in fact, can be meaningfully present only in relation to what is precisely non-present: that-toward-which (future, possibility) and that-out-ofwhich (past, history) life is being lived. There is no immanence without transcendence.
Human being is not the state of being-alive -it is the event, the coming-to-pass of living. As long as life is life, it cannot be "finished with" -life does not attain the most perfect form of actuality, entelecheia, "having-reached-completeness," which Heidegger interprets as the simple resting of a being in its most perfect form of presence in itself and as itself, its eidos.
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On the contrary, living is essentially characterized by perpetual unrest (Unruhe). 16 Yet even though human being is always still "on the way" to itself, living one's life is not simply a process of production, Greek poiēsis, which would be completed upon reaching some final goal or end, telos, lying outside the process itself. Human being is not unfinished in the sense that a building under construction is unfinished. In any given situation of life, the unfinished project I am carrying on with is my life itself. Human being in its unfinished fullness is always already "going on," "in full swing" -energeia, "already operative" 17 . Life is simply this being-on-the-way to itself. 18 In this sense, the movement of human being fits the Aristotelian definition of praxis as pure activity that always already contains its own telos and goes on for its own sake. 19 Yet for Aristotle, praxis in the most authentic sense is a self-immanent motion, a movement entirely devoid of exteriority or incompleteness -that is, rest -whereas life, in any given situation, also has unrealized possibilities and potentialities, Greek dynameis. There is always some "unfinished business" in life. As a self-transcendent and outwards-motivated movement, human being as a whole does not have the self-immanence of praxis. Human being is actualized precisely as long as it has purely potential, unrealized possibilities. When there are no more open possibilities, life is indeed "finished," but in the sense that it is "over and done with." 20 The ecstatic temporality of Dasein thus transgresses and eludes the fundamental classification of activities under poiēsis and praxis: it is a movement that has the transcendence of poiēsis and yet does not attain any external goal but, like praxis, takes place for its own sake. 21 This paradoxical way of being -being fully realized precisely in not-yetbeing finished -is obviously at odds with the sense of being governing Western philosophy,
ousia.
How, then, can the question of the essence of human being as life be addressed from within the framework of ousia? Aristotle's "theological" answer in Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics to the question concerning the final end, the telos, of human life is one of the most decisive moves in the development of Western thought. Here Aristotle's ethical search for the most appropriate human living ends in the conclusion that its fullest realization takes place in the "theoretical" way of life, bios theōrētikos. 22 Theōria or theōrein means simply the "disinterested," non-instrumental beholding of reality -specifically, of the fundamental and necessary, eternal structures of reality. In the activity of theōrein, the living soul ceases to be "out for something," as it constantly is in ordinary life, and concentrates on beholding the permanently and fully present purely for the sake of this presence itself, without reference to any non-actualized possibilities or goals. This makes theōria the most powerful (kratistē), the most contiguous (synechestatē), the most pleasant (hēdistē) and the most self-sufficient and independent (autarkestatos) -all in all, the most present-to-itself and the most fully actualized -form of living one's life. 23 Theōria is not an opposite of praxis, of human activity concerned about itself, on the contrary, it is the perfection of praxis: a movement of life that is motivated purely by the full presence of the fully present. 24 In a certain sense, Aristotle says, this form of living is an athanatizein, "being-immortal" -it entails a certain release from human mortality and finitude. 25 As such, theoretical life is also the most "divine" (theion) way of life possible for the human being. 26 Heidegger emphasizes that in Aristotle, "divine" is to be understood strictly as an ontological term meaning simply "immortal," "self-sufficient" and "most being." 27 In Book
Lambda of the Metaphysics, divinity, the divine way of being -here understood as an ideal that human life may at best approach but never, because of its essential imperfection, permanently attain -is described as having its essence in nous, insight or apprehension, i.e., in the pure, immediate, non-propositional, non-discursive, non-temporal and non-analyzable grasping of indivisible and permanent truths, and particularly in noēsis noēseōs, in the selfreferential divine apprehension apprehending purely itself. The perfection of God entails active awareness, and in order to be perfect, this can only be God's self-awareness of his own perfect activity. 28 God is simply the most perfect presence-in-itself-and-to-itself, without any reference outside or beyond itself. "Indeed, we maintain the divinity [theos] to be a constant and most excellent living being, so that in the divinity a contiguous and constant living [zōē] and span of being are present. For this is precisely what the divinity is." 29 Aristotle thus sees the supreme and essential possibility of life in a certain freeing oneself from mortality and intentionality, from being "out for something." One must, in a way, "cease to exist" in order to realize one's most supreme possibilities as a human beingwhich, at the same time, means approaching divinity. Aristotle thus draws the full "ethical" (nous). 32 Of these, the two principal faculties are phronēsis, i.e., the ability to disclose the active situations of life through the inherent possibilities that they offer for the appropriate life as a whole, and sophia, i.e., comprehension of reality in its fullness with a view to its fundamental and immutable principles and structures. 33 At the end of Book VI, Aristotle addresses the question: which of these is the superior and more profound way of access to the disclosedness of beings? Here Aristotle makes an ontological choice which, in the horizon of ousia, seems inevitable.
Thus it is evident that sophia must be the most rigorous form of knowledge [epistēmē].
[ phronēsis to be the most profound kind of knowledge, unless humans were to be superior to all the other beings in the celestial order [kosmos]. 34 The fundamental reason for this is that phronēsis, which discloses lived reality by grasping each situation in its possibilities, is directed at that which is "contingent," admits of being otherwise (ta endechomena allōs echein), and in fact always is otherwise 35 What makes this point of departure radical is the fact that change and movement were by many earlier thinkers regarded as the very opposites to being in the Greek sense of beingpresent and being-complete, and therefore excluded from philosophical consideration. In his poem, Parmenides makes it clear that since there is being and since there is no non-being, there can be no change or becoming, since that would entail something coming into being, into presence, from non-being, non-presence, and vice versa -what is, then, is one and unified, "untrembling," all at once. 46 It is a commonplace that the Eleatics, the school of Parmenides, denied the reality of movement altogether; Zeno of Elea devised his famous paradoxes to show the impossibility of even thinking movement and change consistently. 47 According to Aristotle, the reason why these philosophers could not come to terms with the reality of movement was their inability to distinguish between absolute (haplōs) and contingent or relative (kata symbebēkos) non-being, between (a) simply not being and (b) not being for now but being capable of coming into being. 48 The necessity of reformulating the thesis of Parmenides had already been seen by Plato in the Sophist: "In order to defend ourselves, it will be necessary for us to put to test the discourse of father Parmenides and to We all see that things change, come to be something and cease to be something else.
Moreover, as in the case of the builder, phenomena that change are meaningfully present to us in view of their yet unrealized capacities and possibilities, that which they are capable of being. The idle builder is, in a way, present to us as a builder, and a construction site is somehow present to us as a building that is still being built. Aristotle gives many other examples: what is cold or warm to touch or tastes sweet is considered to be cold, warm or sweet even when it is not presently felt or tasted, and the person who normally sees is not thought to be blind whenever his or her eyes happen to be closed. 56 The is capable -an expression of "the greatest philosophical knowledge of antiquity," "a knowledge which even today remains unappreciated and misunderstood in philosophy." 59 He does not really tell us why this is so. However, paying attention to the tenses used in
Aristotle's statement may dispel its circularity and help to understand the importance Heidegger attaches to it. What is present (esti) as capable of something is present as such that it will not (estai) be incapable of carrying out the full presence of its capacity. The unemployed builder is now present to us as a builder precisely because we understand the builder to be so disposed that, once the activity building of starts, he or she will be able to carry out this activity in its full extent and in all of its aspects. A slab of marble shows itself to us as a can-be marble sculpture precisely insofar as it is understood to be such that once the activity of carving a sculpture begins, there is nothing essential in the marble itself to stop it from going through the entire process leading to the purpose and end of carving, to the finished sculpture.
rather a phenomenological indication of how something capable is present as capable of something. 60 From a Heideggerian viewpoint, the unique importance -and also the fundamental difficulty -of this indication must lie in the fact that being-present is here described in terms of the future, of what is not yet present. In his definition of dynamis,
Aristotle thus comes across the temporal character of being, the transcendent constitution of meaningful presence through the non-present, the essential relation to absence that constitutes presence. This is precisely the "kinetic meaning of being-ness" which, according
to Thomas Sheehan, is what Heidegger's philosophy is all about.
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According to this reading, kinēsis and dynamis are the two Aristotelian concepts that offer the most radical possibilities for reappropriation. They are intimately interconnected and, in fact, mutually define one another. According to the famous definition in Book III of the Physics, movement is nothing but precisely the full and complete presence of that which
is not yet present fully but only in capacity (dynamei on), precisely insofar as it is something that can and may be and thus is not yet. 62 Thus the actual kinēsis of house building is simply the meaningful presence of a house that is not yet fully present but presently coming to presence. For Heidegger, this definition of movement is part and parcel of Aristotle's great achievement in comparison with the earlier and the later tradition. It is precisely the ontological grasp of kinēsis that makes, for Heidegger, the Physics -instead of the Metaphysics -"the hidden, and therefore never adequately studied, foundational book of Western philosophy." 63 Aristotle's other main characterization of kinēsis is equally decisive:
The reason why movement appears to be something indefinite [aoriston] Being-in-motion is a form of being present, actualized, energeia, but it is an unfinished (atelēs) presence, a presence from which something is still lacking and which cannot be understood without reference to an end that is not yet present.
In short, in phenomenologically elaborating the structures of dynamis and energeia, As we have seen, the full actuality and essence of life is not, in Aristotle's eyes, to be found in an ecstatic outward movement. Life is fully actualized only when it has come to rest and reached the fullest possible self-immanence in theōrein, in contemplation and beholding. But theōrein is still a verb: an enactment of living, a praxis. As Heidegger repeatedly points out, being-at-rest is a mode of mobility -being-at-rest does not make any sense without an inherent possibility of movement.
The purest manifestation of the essence of movedness is to be found where rest does not mean the breaking off and cessation of movement, but rather where movedness is gathered up into standing still, and where this ingathering, far from excluding movedness, includes and for the first time discloses it. 71 In theōrein, life indeed ceases its ecstatic and self-transcendent movement toward itself as a possibility, as a not-yet, and concentrates upon what is fully present. But in thus coming to rest, living is not deprived of movement. Instead, its mode of motivation changes. The movement of life is no longer motivated by something external, by possibilities, by the "notyet," it is no longer directed outwards; it is now motivated by the simple and immediate intuitive reception (nous, noein) of what is completely present as such. 72 In theōrein, the human being no longer reaches beyond its own limits, it is no longer pitched towards exteriority and otherness; it simply "actively" remains itself, living within the boundaries of its own essence, as a self-present and self-identical receptacle of the presence of the present. proper life, and while being happy, one has already attained happiness. 74 For Heidegger, energeia and entelecheia in their fundamental sense mean, for each being, the movement of remaining within, inhabiting its ownmost eidos, its form, that is also its teloswhat this being as such most properly is. For humans, the most perfect energeia would thus be the most perfect praxis, the most perfect way of actively living one's life while having already reached perfection. As has already been shown, this supreme praxis is the pure beholding and contemplation of permanent truths. For humans, theōrein is an intimation of the activity of the divinity, noēsis noēseōs, of apprehension apprehending its own activity.
The divinity is the immobile, unmoved mover; but since the divinity is said to be a life which is constantly like the one we live at our very best, its immobility cannot be understood negatively as a lack of activity. 75 Instead, the divinity has a motivation of its own: it is the self-immanent activity of a perfectly self-transparent and self-coincident self-awareness.
"The theion is noēsis noēseōs only because of the fact that with regard to the basic character of its being, i.e., to its movedness, such apprehending satisfies most purely the idea of beingmoved as such." 76 The Heideggerian reappropriation of Aristotle is thus not a simple transformation of a "static" understanding of life into a "dynamic" and "kinetic" conception of living. It is rather the transition from one understanding of the movedness of life into a more original form of movement -the transition from a divine to a mortal mobility, the translation of the "theological" Western ontology into a more archaic, "anthropological" one. The Greeks thought movement and activity on the basis of the paradigmatic activity of resting in perfection; Heidegger seeks to think the most fundamental movement, the movement of human living, as one that never comes to a halt and never attains perfection, if not precisely in its imperfection. The effort of Being and Time is to show how a finite, imperfect, ecstatic, self-transcendent and outward-motivated movedness is the necessary but overlooked ontological horizon and background for the constitution of the ideal of an infinite, perfect, self-immanent and inward-motivated movement of living.
